Brazilian Immigration and the Reconstruction of Racial Hierarchies of the Portuguese Empire

Igor José de Renó Machado

Introduction

Since the 1980s, Brazilians have immigrated to Portugal, making up the second largest immigrant community in the former metropolis. This movement accompanies structural transformations in the two countries: Brazil, once upon a time a Portuguese colony, has gradually turned into a country of emigrants due to continued impoverishment. Portugal, on the other hand, since its insertion in the European Union, has became a country of immigrants. First of all, members of its ex-African colonies go looking for a better life in Portugal; they are followed by Brazilians and Eastern Europeans. But the history of migration and immigration of Brazil and Portugal is intimately connected: during the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th, a great number of Portuguese emigrants, around 1,200,000, came to Brazil. This historical process marked the history of the ex-metropolis and the ex-colony with ambiguity as Feldman-Bianco (2001b) and Ribeiro (1997) showed, and also produced consequences in the ongoing emigration of Brazilians to Portugal.

Analyzing the flow of Brazilians to Portugal, I intend to show the symbolic context of the Brazilian insertion in the country in such a way as to identify the Portuguese “hierarchy of otherness” – that symbolic structure which establishes a status scale for different populations – and how it was created. I will show how the coloniality of power (Grasfoguel, 2000; Quijano, 1988) – the maintenance of racial-hierarchical structures which permeated all Portuguese imperial thought – is responsible for the reoccurrence of a racial way of looking at differences. In other words, individuals from different nationalities who immigrate to Portugal find that they are located at a pre-determined place on a scale, principally due to the fact that until 1988 a great part of the immigrant population was composed of people from the ex-colonies who were subject to extensive descriptions and analyses that were done and re-done in colonial thought.

1 This text is part of a more far reaching study about Brazilian immigration in the city of Porto, Portugal. The affirmations about Brazilian immigration presented here are based on a field study done between February and October in 2000. The field work focused on poor and illegal Brazilian immigrants. There is not quantitative data on the numbers of those illegal immigrants. Official censuses are restricted to legalized immigrants. The available information suggests that legalized Brazilian population form the second largest immigrant group in Portugal (see Baganha 1997).
The presence of the PALOP (African Countries of official Portuguese language: these name, used by Portuguese government, include Mozambique, Angola, St. Tomé and Prince, Guinee-Bissau and Cape-Verde) and Brazilian immigrants in post-colonial Portugal as the majority, made way for continuities of former colonial thought which was based upon “scientific racism”. These continuities resulted on reconstruction of the old imperial order – now focused on the immigrants of its former colonies.

The symbolic organization of otherness, the way that members of different nationalities and places are put into a hierarchy created by nationalistic ideology (Fox, 1990) that rules in Portugal, is the consequence of the Portuguese colonial thought reconstructed after the loss of Brazil in 1822 in the period known as the Third Empire. In the 20th Century, this way of thinking was still going on as Lusotropicalism (in its Portuguese version) and actually as Lusophony (to be analyzed later on). I try to demonstrate how the experience of the Third Empire is fundamental for understanding the shape of the symbolic universe within which Brazilians are inserted and how Brazil has a specific role in it, one of being a model for Portuguese Africa. This influence the ways in which it poorer Brazilian immigrants will be placed in Portuguese society. The focus is in that which Feldman-Bianco (2001a: 477) called “the production of imperial continuities”, than it is in the ruptures accentuated by the post-colonial theory (Cooper and Stoller, 1997). As Feldman-Bianco suggests, my aim is to “differ from studies that focus solely on the so-called post-colonial moment, that is to say the “moment after the Empire”. Those studies tend to examine primarily the ruptures and differences after independence, focusing on the construction of new ideologies. In spite of their contributions, post-colonial studies by leaving out the cultural and political continuities sustained in spite of dramatic political ruptures have been able to present only partial histories. In contraposition, our stress on reconfigurations that represents enduring connections despite dramatic change points to the complexities of continuing

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2 Researcher at CEMI (Center for the Study of International Migrations), Ph.D. student in Social Sciences at UNICAMP (State University of Campinas).
3 During the last five years, however, the situation has changed with the arrival of large contingents of Eastern European immigrants.
5 The First Portuguese Empire extending from 1450 to 1550 was founded on the domination of the sea routes to Asia. The Second Empire, also know as the Luso-Brazilian, lasted from 1550 to 1822 and was centralized on the exploration of Brazil. The Third Empire practically speaking began at the end of the 19th Century with the effective colonization of Africa, but it formally began with the recognition of Brazilian independence in 1825, and it lasted until 1974.
6 “(O)ur emphasis on colonialism as an ongoing process aims at bringing to light social continuities – or reconfigurations – of empire within the context of dramatic change. (Feldman-Bianco 2001a:481).
colonizing projects of former colonial powers producing homogeneity as well as difference.” (Feldman-Bianco 2001a:481).

I analyze the consequence of these processes of constructing identities among Brazilians in Portugal, specifically in the city of Porto. In order to do this, it was necessary to work with notions of commoditification and objectification of culture in today’s capitalist context and the relation between these processes and the construction of identities. I elaborate the concept of pastiche-identity to understand these phenomena and the results of superimposing different racial orders in Portugal and those brought by Brazilians.

I intend to show how the universal symbols gradually delineates the encounters and confrontations between Brazilians and the Portuguese. These universes condition the manner of insertion as well as the response of the immigrants to the conflicts that are going on.

**Myths, Colonial Ideologies and their Racial Hierarchies**

The Portuguese colonial project in Africa was supported by two myths according to Alexandre (2000:220): Eldorado and the Sacred Heritage. The first one is the belief in the infinite wealth of Africa which compensated the loss of Brazil in 1822. The second one sees the conservation of the Empire as an historical imperative by considering the territorial possessions as testimony of the great conquests of the past. To lose them would be to lose the nation itself. The endemic nationalism that distinguishes the colonial project that is symbolically based on these myths and carefully inculcated in Portuguese education produces the following image of the country and the dominated peoples: the naturalization of ethnic centered racism, a hierarchy influenced by the *Social Darwinism* of the 19th Century which extended itself to the 21st in different ways, is established as the vertebrae of the imperial regime (idem: ibidem).

The rise of *Lusotropicalism* as the official doctrine of the Portuguese State in the 1950s can only be understood from an historical perspective that is capable of elucidating the nuances and differences that this “theory”, produced by a Brazilian intellectual, acquires in Portugal. The *Lusotropicalism* of the Brazilian Gilberto Freyre, which attributes to the Portuguese the responsibility for the harmonious construction of
a new and unique tropical civilization, was the theory adopted by the Portuguese State after the Second World War. According to this point of view, the Portuguese had not deprived themselves of sweet miscegenation and integration with the natives which created something new that led to the eminently famous myth of Brazilian “racial democracy”\(^8\). There was supposed to be a special capacity of the Portuguese to relate to other peoples, especially in tropical regions and, consequently, a capacity to serve as a connection between cultures.

After the Second World War, Portuguese colonial state changed the conception of empire to be one of assimilation where the colonies came to be called “overseas provinces” in 1951 of a supposed one nation (Feldman-Bianco 1992, 2001b). Legislation tried to avoid the obligations imposed by the principles established in the Charter of the United Nations (Cabral, 1978: 79). It was then that *Lusotropicalismo* appeared as official doctrine, but not without internal resistance. According to authors like Bender (1980), Castelo (1998), Moutinho (2000), Boxer (1967) and Alexandre (2000), theses of *Lusotropicalismo* (the special capacity of the Portuguese to create new tropical societies racially just and fraternal) are merely ideologies of the State to legitimize a colonialism that was no longer sustained internationally. There was no “union” among the African peoples as supposed by the theory, nor did there emanate from the Portuguese nation the will for miscegenation which, to the contrary, was definitively repudiated. Relations with the native populations were exactly the opposite of that dictated by the ideology.

Thus, “giving importance to the Black cultures and, above all, praise of miscegenation were totally opposed to ideas current in Portugal during the first half of the 20\(^{th}\) Century” (Alexandre, 2000: 298/299). The adoption of Portuguese *Lusotropicalismo* tried to make the colonial enterprise appear scientific and to justify it internationally. However violent and endemic nationalism could not help but influence Portuguese *Lusotropicalismo* by substituting the idea of tropical, regional civilization - an idea present in its Brazilian place of origin – with another that was eminently national. This version of Portuguese *Lusotropicalismo* is necessarily different from the one we know in Brazil with its origin in *Casa Grande e Senzala* (1933)[Master and

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7 See Gilberto Freyre, 1933, 1941, 1961.
8 The myth of racial democracy, the fruit of Gilberto Freyre’s work (1933), is still today the center of Brazilian nationalist discourse (Fox, 1990). According to the theory of Brazilian Racial Democracy, Brazil is a country where coexistence between “races” is more fraternal, where there is no discrimination and racism. About racial democracy as myth, see DaMatta (1987).
Slaves]. Various authors consider that the ideology of miscegenation or the “myth of the three races” in Brazil covers up an ideology of Whitening, broadly speaking, an idea that being closer to White is better and it is this which influences the systems of Brazilian racial classification with its emphasis on Mestizo.

In the reconstruction of imperial thought in Portugal there was no veiled intention to insert the idea of Whitening in the racial classification system. This is due to the fact that racism is a given reality in the premises of the system which is clearly anti-miscegenation. Portuguese *Lusotropicalism* probably operates only as a new legitimization of the Empire which does not allow concessions to non-White cultures, that is, it does not disguise the colonial hierarchy. Perhaps it could be said that Portuguese *Lusotropicalism* re-affirms the idea of Brazil as the grand product of the richness of the Portuguese soul, restructuring Brazil’s position in the Portuguese imagination: if Brazil is its grand creation, it is subaltern; if it is subaltern, its citizens are in an inferior position in the hierarchy of otherness.

Portuguese *Lusotropicalism* can be understood to serve as a type of scientific theory for making a hierarchy that recomposes Portuguese morale by reinforcing Portuguese superiority over Brazil, the land of Mestizos. *Lusotropicalism* is a real intellectual-ideological oasis for Portuguese intellectuals because it justifies the Portuguese presence in Africa and subordinates Brazil at the same time. Subordinating Brazil was important to somehow resolve Portuguese frustration at the loss of the Luso-Brazilian Empire (Second Empire) because of Brazilian independence in the 19th Century. Obviously, the *Lusotropicalism* that serves as an “oasis” in the Portuguese version excludes important characteristics mentioned by Freyre which are incompatible with colonial racism. The imperial conception in force was always incompatible with the idea of fusing elements from different cultures for the creation of a *Lusotropical* civilization (Castelo 1998:86).

Since there was no substantial evidence of the supposed Portuguese tolerance defended by *Lusotropicalism*, intellectuals of the Portuguese Empire turned to Brazil to affirm that “Brazil, created by us, is a racial democracy, we will do the same with

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10 That the system of Portuguese racial classification is anti-miscegenation can be deduced in the works of Moutinho (2000), Bender (1980) and Boxer (1967). An initial affirmation of mine is that there is no idea of Whitening. Feldman-Bianco (2001b: 628), for example, shows that the Socialist Government (1996-2002), in the political campaigns towards emigrants from former colonies, have stressed the motto “we are all the same (that is mestizos), we are all different”.

Africa”. This can be illustrated in these words of the dictator Salazar: “That a multiracial society is possible is proved in the first place by Brazil, the greatest Latin American power, precisely from Portuguese roots, and it would be necessary to deny this reality, among many others, in order to refuse the possibility of this type of social nature in the African territory” (Antonio de Oliveira Salazar apud Bender, 1980:43 [my translation]).

A Brazilian myth is used to ideologically justify the oppression in Africa. Lusotropicalism is fertile because the image of Brazil as a “racial paradise” had international legitimacy. After the adoption of Freyre’s mythology by the New Portuguese State, the image of Brazil as a Mestizo paradise created under the coordination of the Portuguese character was firmly consolidated in Portugal. The myth of the empire spread the image of Brazil as Mestizo, an example of the capacity of the Portuguese people for miscegenation. This is important in order to situate the symbolic universe in which Brazilian immigrants are located and to allow us to perceive how the colonial hierarchy, within which the whole Empire is reorganized, functions.

**Lusophony and Imperial Continuities**

In the decades of 1980 and 1990 after the Revolution of the Carnations in 1974, which witnessed the end of the Third Empire, the link between empire and the essence of the nation was reborn as modified and elaborated in the symbolic dominance of “Lusophony”, the strategy of reconstructing the imperial myth by employing the concept of Portuguese “cultural heritage”11. The new myth is a further development of Portuguese Lusotropicalism which reestablishes the colonial hierarchies constructed in the enduring Portuguese Colonial Empire. Colonial power is maintained and the discourse that sustains it is modernized after years of uncertainty in the wake of the Revolution of the Carnations12. It was in this context that Brazilian immigrants found themselves immersed in the Lusophony reconstruction of imperial mythology as subjects already inserted in an order of otherness.

The colonial mindset, as Alexandre (2000:229) affirms, did not disappear with the end of the Empire, but, rather, camouflaged itself. After 1951 it was camouflaged as

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11 However, lusophony arose from the impulse on the part of Brazilian diplomacy as demonstrated by Feldman-Bianco (2001b: 629-637).
12 In 1974 the dictatorial regime of the New State is overthrown by a popular revolution, known as the Revolution of the Carnations. For two years the revolutionary government was clearly communist, promoting the nationalization of large business groups and agrarian reform, for example. After this initial period, by means of what Cunhal (1999) calls the “coup inside the revolution” power gradually returned to conservative Portuguese forces.
Lusotropical, but actually it is clothed as Lusophony. The Lusophony attitude continues to work with the same premises and dimensions as the imperial mind, but now evidently without the offensive racist affirmations that were common in the first half of the 20th Century. This persistence is what is called coloniality of power (Quijano, 1998). Actually, these structures recreate inside Portugal the hierarchies among immigrant populations. “The world which the Portuguese created”\(^\text{13}\) is reorganized with immigrants from the ex-colonies according to the same basic division between the civilized and the primitive. The colonial mind, which is hegemonic in Gramsci’s sense and which had been threatened after the Revolution of the Carnations, returns in a truly passive revolution\(^\text{14}\) of conservative thinking.

The principal concept of Lusotropicalism, the “Portuguese way of being in the world”, refers according to Castelo (1998:14) to the construction of a Portuguese “I” that “in a certain way still endures in actual political and cultural discourse”. There is the constant reconstruction, 25 years after the wars of independence, of the idea that the Portuguese are not racist, predisposed to coexistence with other peoples and have a vocation to be universal. All this is used to justify “an approximation with Lusophonic peoples in the name of their common language and history and a supposed cultural and affectionate unity (idem: ibidem). That is to say, there is a continuity between Lusotropicalism and today’s Lusophony which share the same intellectual essence of a mythical image of Portuguese identity supported by a certain reading of Freyre’s theory. Lusophony tries to remake the same myths, but now with emphasis on the fraternity and common sentiments existing between countries where the Portuguese is the official language, as if what happened before 1974 was forgotten and the myth was what really happened. Although Lusotropicalism had served to “explain the endurance of the Empire during the period of giving up the remaining colonies, […] [the] political proposition was [now] frustrated. But the ideological theme came to know better days: even today the myth of an ‘ecumenical vocation’ or a special relationship with the Overseas Peoples strongly impressed the consciousness that the Nation had of itself” (Alexandre, 2000:229 [my translation]).

Lusophony, considered by Margarido (2000) the hegemonic manner of Portuguese social thought, is fundamental in the internal organization of immigration in

\(^{13}\) “The world which the Portuguese created” is the title of one of the works of Gilberto Freyre that sustains Portuguese Lusotropicalism.

\(^{14}\) Concerning the concepts of “hegemony” and “passive revolution” of Gramsci, see Gramsci (2001, vols. I and III); see also Dias (1996) and Buci-Glucksmann (1980).
Portugal, and it directly effects the life of around 40,000 Brazilian immigrants\textsuperscript{15}. The importance that \textit{Lusophony} gives to the role of language increased when the Empire disappeared after 1974; it was given the role of recovering Portuguese greatness which had formerly been that of the colonized territories. \textit{Lusophony} serves as an instrument for the maintenance of racial gradations upon which colonial discourse had been based after its bloody end, erasing the past and recuperating the old hegemony in spite of its discourse being constructed from a supposed similarity shared by all those who speak the Portuguese language. \textit{Lusophony} serves as the structure of a hierarchical order which scales immigrants, “residues” of the Empire who go to Portugal to flee from the disaster that was the Portuguese inheritance at home. It is a painful irony that the immigrants were the preferential field for symbolic reorganization of the Portuguese Imperial Order\textsuperscript{16}.

\textbf{Brazilian Immigrants and Cross-Representations}

However, the \textit{Lusophony} discourse has turned into a trap for Brazilians, Mozambicans, Angolans, Cape-verdeans, and others African immigrants from the Portuguese ex-colonies as Feldman-Bianco (2001b) show; because the idea of a Lusophonic space, as the myth that it is, is never acted out in practice. During the 1990s the principal political strategy of associations of immigrants from the ex-Portuguese colonies was to claim “special” rights based on \textit{Lusophony}, believing in the State ideology which preached an affectionate communion between countries using Portuguese as the official language, trying to force the Government to concede privileges. Besides being inefficacious due to the strictness of the European Community’s immigration laws, this strategy resulted in reinforcing \textit{Lusophony}. This revitalized colonial ideology ended up reinforcing the colonial hierarchy within which Brazil occupied an intermediary place between Africans\textsuperscript{17} and Portuguese, as I demonstrated above. This process directly reflected on the life of Brazilian immigrants. But before getting to that, it is necessary to talk about another fundamental process: the migration of Portuguese to Brazil during the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century and the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th}.

\textsuperscript{15} Within the general picture of immigration in Portugal, the Brazilian community is the second largest, only smaller than that from Cabo Verde.

\textsuperscript{16} Discussed, among other items, by Thomaz (1997), Castelo (1998) and Alexandre (2000).

\textsuperscript{17} This hierarchy also establishes distinctions among the different African populations that were dominated by Portugal. These distinctions are still working in today’s Portugal and make the otherness hierarchy more complex than it appears in this paper. For analytical purposes, I analyze only the location of Brazilians immigrants in this hierarchy.
As Ribeiro showed (1997, 2000), throughout the 19th Century while it tried to reconstruct the Empire in Africa, Portugal was experiencing an enormous migration to Brazil. In Brazil, the Portuguese entirely controlled commerce even after Independence, which enormously stimulated Portuguese migration. This migration caused two series of consequences that are very interesting. In Brazil, it caused a series of representations of the Portuguese which were mediated by conflicts in the job market. When the Portuguese became the target of popular indignation during the turbulent end of the 19th Century in Brazil, hatred of the Portuguese was one of the symbolic weapons used to affirm the recently founded Brazilian Republic (1889). The stereotypes that were produced about the Portuguese have lasted until today with incredible strength. Actually, the Portuguese are the preferred object of Brazilian jokes, always being seen as jackasses, stupid and avaricious (idem: ibdem).

Numerous Portuguese migrants returned to Portugal, many of whom were now extremely wealthy. The role they had in Portuguese society in the second half of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th was enormous and set off hatred and conflicts (Alves, 1994). Known in Portugal as ‘Brasileiros de torna-viagem’, these Portuguese were severely criticized by Portuguese intellectuals, principally the literati. They became the subjects of crude characterizations that accentuated a supposed lack of education, rudeness and ignorance. These images remained so deeply engraved in the Portuguese imagination that in a way they became linked to Brazil and Portuguese resentment over the loss of the ex-American colony; and there was the fact that the Portuguese migration to Brazil itself was seen as a “bloodletting” of people which had kept the Portuguese colonial projects from getting underway.

Thus, we have the stereotypes about the Portuguese produced in Brazil (Feldman-Bianco: 2001b; Ribeiro, 1997; Machado, 2001, Vieira, 1991) and about Brasileiros de torna-viagens in Portugal (Alves, 1994). Today, when Brazilians immigrate to Portugal, these two orders of representation are activated and all the experience of them is mediated by the place Brazil has in the symbolic Portuguese universe and by the stereotypes of the Portuguese which Brazilians have. Thus, symbolic structures are imposed on Brazilians. This symbolic subordination is also made as a defense against what became known in Portugal as the “Brazilian invasion”.

18 Historians estimate that around 1,500,000 Portuguese immigrated to Brazil between 1850 and 1950. Diverse historians figured different numbers, but all are above 1,000,000 immigrants. For a discussion about the numbers of Portuguese immigrants to Brazil, see Alencastro (1988).

19 It means “those who returned from their trip to Brazil”.
During the last two decades of the 20th Century, the Brazilian media came to have great influence in Portugal, to the degree that the most popular television programs were Brazilian soap operas. Besides TV, Brazilian music also invaded Portugal, occupying much space on the radio and television. One part of the Portuguese intelligentsia demonstrated great resentment of the ex-colony during this period because of this reverse colonizaton.

The resentment of the intelligentsia regarding Brazil, together with the ideological reconstruction of the Empire through Lusophony (which is a rereading of Lusotropicism) resulted in the fixation of the representation which put Brazilian immigrants in a subaltern position that was nevertheless superior to that of the Africans. The location of Brazilians in the reconstructed racial hierarchy of the Portuguese Empire, added to the discourse of identity defended by the Brazilian State, determines the type of work they will obtain in the Portuguese job market. In this reconstructed hierarchy that resulted from the Portuguese reading of Lusotropicism, Brazilians are seen as Mestizos with specific characteristics like being cheerful, friendly and expansive. These characteristics are related to stereotypes about return trip Brazilian as well as racial Brazilian ideologies based on Freyre’s work (which today constitute the center of Brazilian nationalistic discourse) and also to the reading of Freyre’s Lusotropicism by the Portuguese Salazar regime.

**Pastiche-Identities and Hegemony**

By accentuating the stereotypical image of Brazilians, the Portuguese symbolic universe reinforces something that was latent in the concept that all Brazilians have about themselves, namely, that they are naturally cheerful, friendly, docile and smart. Representations of Brazil project a subaltern place for Brazilians which is constantly reaffirmed by the submission of many Brazilians to the stereotypes which in turn ends up sustaining the stereotypes themselves. The place in the job market delimited for Brazilians in the actual European political scene is characterized by this supposed natural cheerfulness, making it easier for Brazilians to get some types of jobs like being waiters, salespersons, musicians, etc. In this manner, Brazilians who perform their

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20 Articles in the Portuguese press made this resentment public (Machado, 2002).
21 Concerning resentment, see Nietzsche (1976); Scheler (1994); Merton (1970); Ansart (2001); Ansart-Dourlen (2001); Galvão (2001).
22 About nationalistic discourse, see Fox (1990).
expected pantomimes reinforce what becomes accepted as characteristic of Brazilians (e.g. cheerfulness) and also contribute to their subaltern “identity”\(^\text{23}\).

The construct of “being Brazilian” is a process where a manner of being – what circulates in Portugal as the Brazilian stereotype – is culturally imposed and ends up permeating discourse about the identity of many immigrants who incorporate a subaltern place in the way of looking at the world\(^\text{24}\). The fact that the majority of Brazilians uncritically subject themselves to the hierarchy’s representations and use them as a mechanism of self-identification of “being Brazilian” allows me to affirm that the symbolic language which unites different Brazilians is an identity emptied by shallow symbols which already existed in Portugal but also come from Brazil. To explain what “empty identity” means, it is necessary to make a rather long but fundamental theoretical digression.

The ideas of Jameson (1991) about the pastiche or simulacrum of historicity, which to him exist in a post-modern culture, are related to what I will call a “pastiche” of identity in post-modern culture. There is a relation between his ideas about the actual lack of depth in the perception of history and processes that I consider similar in make up to national and ethnic identities in today’s globalized world. The principal characteristic of this post-modern ambient is “a new kind of flatness or depthlessness, a new kind of superficiality in the most literal sense, perhaps the supreme formal feature of post-modernisms” (idem: 9). In the actual non-profound world, “(...) depth is replaced by surface, or by multiple surfaces” (idem: 12). Fragmentation of post-modernity is marked by the “imitation of dead styles, speech through all the masks and voices stored up in the imaginary museum of a new global culture” (idem: 18), or yet by “a world transformed into sheer images of itself” (idem: ibidem). In this context, “The past is thereby itself modified: (...) it has meanwhile itself become a vast collection of images, an photographic simulacrum” (idem: ibidem).

This “logic of the simulacrum, with its transformation of older realities into television images does more than merely replicate the logic of late capitalism: It reinforces and intensifies it” (Jameson, 1991: 46). Thus, we live a “cultural form of

\(^{23}\) These affirmations are constructed from the principal source used in this study which was interviews with poor and lower middleclass immigrants that were done during February of 1998. Also, observations and more interviews during the field work were made between March and September of 2000. In my opinion, this type of immigrant represents the majority, although the bibliography about the theme is still stuck to the idea that Brazilian immigrants are in some way highly qualified. Concerning this question, see Machado (2001); about another opinion of Brazilian immigration, see Baganha (1998/99).

image addiction which, by transforming the past into visual mirages, stereotypes or texts, effectively abolishes any practical sense of the future and of the collective project…” (Jameson, 1991: 46).

This is the basic reasoning, what I call the “crisis of historicity”, for relating to the similar crisis of identity in post-modernity. In this way, I link the crisis of historicity to the production of objectified cultures in Late Capitalism. The “pastiche” of history that is characteristic of Late capitalism can be related to the “pastiche” of identity; this in turn becomes more and more solidified, essentialized and materialized without its own history, reduced to images easily consumed in a post-modern and globalized cultural industry. To demonstrate the existence of this process of essentialization of identity, confer the examples given by authors like Handler (1988) and Herzfeld (1997).

The efficiency and effectiveness of the pastiche identity reduces cultures to images. What is really important is a visible language and the absolute absence of depth that allows us to forget all the history that made and continues to make it possible for some images to be not what they represent, but the very identities they ought to symbolize. These identities are formed and constructed in processes similar to those of the simulacrum of perception of historicity; by means of this, disconnected pieces and images cut out of the nostalgic past are assembled as spiritual material for these very same identities, pieces that are of the same shape, empty images of the past divested of historical depth. We are talking about fixed, separate and unrelated identities. In this sense – that of the solidification of identity images – we can see a relationship between the analysis of the identity crisis and the historicity crisis, both being parts of the same process, which Jameson calls the “the dominant of the cultural logic of Late Capitalism”.

But the pastiche-identity is not an inert symbolical construction. Rather, it creates conducts, views and makes reflections about “being” in the world. It brings about conflicts and strategies for accumulating symbolic capital. In this way, I can affirm that pastiche-identities, although empty of meaningful content and reduced to stereotypes and simplified images, can be the center of political disputes and different ways of representation in the same manner that such images are manipulated. These are the reasons why I try to analyze how images and stereotypes are produced among Brazilians and Portuguese; I try to understand how the “semantic picture” of Brazil and Brazilians was constructed and also how the images of Portugal and the Portuguese,
which Brazilians have were constructed. These images are manipulated by Brazilians as well as the Portuguese in their political encounters.

The image of the *Brasileiro de torna-viagem* of the 19th Century followed by the Portuguese version of *Lusotropicalism* of Post World War II and now actually *Lusophony* are fundamental for the way Brazil is seen today in Portugal. Besides this, the very production of exoticism among Portuguese intelligentsia and Brazilian national discourse reinforce the stereotypes of Brazil in Portugal – and in the world – through the media like the example of the classic Jorge Amado Novel “Gabriela Carnation and Cinnamon”, which was transformed into the soap opera that inaugurated the phase of great Brazilian television successes in Portugal. It is relatively obvious that Brazilian immigrants came to think of themselves in terms of a pastiche-identity in conscious discourse. But, what experience shows is that this identity is always conflicting with the diversity of Brazilian population in Portugal. Brazilian in Portugal come originally from different Brazilian regions, different cultural traditions and socio-economic backgrounds.

Brazilians do not form one single community. They only have in common the Brazilian pastiche-identity that is emphasized in empty stereotypes. The struggle for a “central” identity, the greatest approximation to the pastiche-identity, favors those who better represent the pastiche-identity discourse current in Portugal like Cariocas (people from Rio de Janeiro) and Baianos (people from Bahia) – social groups in Brazil that are legitimate representations of the national Brazilian discourse. It is easy to understand how Brazilians are susceptible to incorporating a view of themselves that is reinforced by the Portuguese semantic context. In this environment, the internal view of being Brazilian which is emerging must dialogue with the symbolic Portuguese universe and the internal dispute for some kind of hegemony as representative of this future concept of being Brazilian.

**Mestizos in the Racial Order**

The principal idea I would like to propose is that current stereotypes about Brazilians in Portugal imprison their action. Being constantly subjected to representations fixed by the racial hierarchy common in Portugal, immigrant Brazilians end up performing pre-established roles. In this Portuguese scenario, perceptions about a supposed Brazilian “essence” that becomes cultural capital for the poorer

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25 Rio de Janeiro and Bahia are Brazilians states.

26 These affirmations always refer to lower and lower middle class Brazilians.
Brazilians immigrants. In the job market of the city of Porto, the Brazilian presence stands out in hotel services, restaurants, night clubs, bars and shops. This is due to a confluence of practical and symbolic reasons: 1) there is a constant allegation of the lack of labor, principally in the tourist area which involves directly attending the public; 2) in these professions of waiting on the public, fluency in Portuguese is fundamental, which for the time being practically excludes Eastern European immigrants; 3) the common opinion of the Portuguese that Brazilians are cheerful and friendly and therefore naturally prepared for waiting on the public is allied to prejudice about members of ex-colonies in Africa who, even though they speak Portuguese, do not get these jobs. Africans are limited to manual work that is very little visible to the public.

Brazilians are used to respond to the needs of the job market and the symbolic predisposition that puts them in a fixed category. Because the Brazilian image is sexualized in Portugal, the immigration of Brazilian women to work in prostitution is a very important phenomenon. It seems like Brazilian prostitutes are brought over because the Brazilian woman is seen as cheerful and sensual, and thus very useful as an attraction for Portuguese nightclubs. But the fact is that this symbolic representation of the Brazilian woman creates a demand for prostitutes from the ex-colony in the Portuguese sex market. It is not an accident that in the perception of the situation of the Brazilian immigrant the narration is punctuated by problems related to prostitution within the play of images that feed and are fed by opposing representations. These images put into contradiction old ideas, new ideas brought by soap operas and everyday problems that are related to the job market. The symbolic universe that is full of reciprocal representations, a real play of mirrors, gains a new connotation in the experience of Brazilian immigration in Portugal.

Brazilian “cheerfulness” became a necessity in the Portuguese job market by being transformed, on the one hand, into a natural advantage and, on the other, into a “symbolic prison”. Nevertheless, it must be said that the great part of these workers are not covered by normal labor regulations and as a result they earn less and are more easily exploited by their employer. Reflection on any daily experience reveals that an enormous set of symbolic representations and stereotypes are in play. Many Brazilians occupy a particular position in the job market because they are seen as naturally better

27 Reflection about the relation between the job market, salaries and policies of the Portuguese State is being developed in a study that is underway. See also Machado, 2001.
and more friendly than Africans. This idea creates another fact: some Portuguese employers choose to engage the services of Brazilians who in turn begin to “professionally” exercise their friendliness. In this sense, the stereotypes are “symbolic prisons” which limit the work of Brazilians in Portugal. Furthermore, the submission of Brazilian workers to illegal working conditions helps to put this discourse into effect. We must not forget that often these ideas are simply excuses to legitimize the presence of Brazilians and to conceal the explicit exploitation to which they are subjected in the job market. The experience that Brazilians have of working in Portuguese society, more specifically in the city of Porto where I did my field work, gives rise to a mixture of symbolic expectations, universes of meaning, ideologies and oppressive exploitation of labor.

But subjection to stereotypes of pastiche-identity and public discourse about being Brazilian do not necessarily mean that these immigrants actually reduce their world view to empty identities. On the contrary, the life of these people is anchored to solid cultural universes of a regional character. These are the disputes that articulate the discourse of power among Brazilians. But the relation to the pastiche-identity is nevertheless utilized as the principal means of legitimization by some Brazilians like Cariocas and Baianos who fit better in the Brazilian stereotype. The interesting thing is that the pastiche-identity is mestizo and among the poorer Brazilians of Porto it partially suppresses the ideal of whitening that proposes the Brazilian master narrative.28

In this context, White Brazilians, even though they are White, can suffer discrimination in the confrontation between the two racial orders in Portugal. On the one hand, there is the Portuguese Lusophony order which is openly hierarchical and considers Brazil as Mestizo, although in an intermediary place between Black and White. On the other, there is the racial order in which Brazilians in Brazil are classed and which privileges the Mestizo category to the degree that it serves the concept of “Whitening. It makes more flexible the rigid racial traits of this class, but always with a tendency to give more value to the White pole of this order. The clash between the two orders, both of which were legitimized by the same theory (created by Gilberto Freyre) arose from the fact that White Brazilians are seen as Mestizos in Portugal, suffering a lower status along with non-White Brazilians. The opposite happens with non-White

Brazilians because they have a higher status than in Brazil, and they use this to justify their position in disputes between Brazilians. This is one of the principal characteristics of the process of constructing Brazilian identities in Porto, influenced by images that exist in Portugal and the way the Portuguese think about racial hierarchy. The question of Whitening does not exist in Portugal; once Mestizo, always Mestizo. In Brazil, miscegenation is the other face of a racial ideology of Whitening.

The conflict between the two different racial orders is the cause of the greater number of disputes of Brazilians among themselves and with the Portuguese. While in Brasil, miscegenation is an ambiguous strategy that makes racial classifications more flexible and disguises deep racism, in Portugal there is no ambiguity whatsoever: the racial order might be seen as Mestizo for the populations of the ex-colonies, but inside the Portuguese metropolis, you are either White or not. In the Portuguese order, Brazilians are Mestizos, but below White Portuguese and above Blacks and Africans. The problem is that the White Brazilian immigrants do not see themselves in this order and do not align themselves in the supposed racial Brazilian democracy with Blacks of their own proper nationality. But in Portugal, Brazilian Mestizos and Blacks have a chance to be “equal” to Brazilian Whites and more distant from African Blacks, the most discriminated class. By being incorporated in the “Mestizo” category in Portugal, Brazilian Blacks have for example better conditions than Africans (represented as Blacks).

**Final Comments**

I tried to show how the symbolic Portuguese universe, prevalent in the country to which many Brazilians immigrate, is marked by dense representations about Brazil. The reconstruction of imperial ideologies through *Lusophony* is found fully developed in Portugal and in this reconstruction Brazil has a specific place, subordinate to Portugal and superior to African countries. When Brazilian immigrants fight for special rights by appealing to *Lusophony* (the idea that a fraternity exists among those who speak Portuguese), they reinforce the subaltern place that this ideology confers on them. The process of consolidation of these imperial hierarchies involves the internal reorganization of immigrant populations in such a way as to reconstruct the racial and hierarchical order of the ex-Empire inside Portugal.

Brazilians occupy a special place in this internal reorganization due to their privileged, although subaltern, position in the racial hierarchy. This special place is
result of a series of representations about Brazil that are derived from the dense symbolic complex that involves Brazil in Portugal. The concept of the *return trip Brazilian* of the 19th Century, or the Brazilian Mestizo imagined in the idea of *Lusotropicalism*, as well as the Portuguese resentment of the influence of Brazilian media are responsible for the image of Brazilian immigrants that is created in Portugal. This image ends up determining how these immigrants are inserted in Portuguese society, demanding that they submit to the existing representations that objectify them and deny them some ways of making a living by forcing them to perform those jobs that are symbolically delimited for them like waiting on the public as waiters, shop workers and salespersons.

The jobs that Brazilians get in Portugal reflect the desire to make them subaltern, one of the objectives of significant parts of the Portuguese intelligentsia and which they promote through projects of reconstructing colonial hierarchies. The presence of innumerable representations – symbolic prisons for Brazilians --, together with the clash between the two different racial orders results in developing pastiche-identities which become the center of disputes among Brazilian immigrants. The fact that the racial orders were justified by the same nucleus of ideas that were elaborated by Gilberto Freyre does not mean that they are not different. Since the predominant order is the Portuguese one, which sees Brazilians as Mestizos, non-White Brazilian immigrants have an opportunity to improve their *status*. The inverse happens to White Brazilians who are seen in Portugal as Mestizos. This reinforces even more the stereotypes because Brazilian Blacks and Mestizos exploit those stereotypes for improving their economic survival, taking advantage of the Portuguese racial order to increase their proper power in relation to the rest of the Brazilian immigrants. This is because of the pastiche-identity, that fixed and stereotyped image of the identity of Brazilians in Portugal which produces and reinforces practices of making yourself exotic according to the rules of the symbolic Portuguese universe that is loaded with images about Brazil.

In the face of these internal structural transformations and symbolic reconstructions of the Empire, Brazilian immigrants discover a rigid representation of themselves, based on representations already existing in Portugal and in the national Brazilian discourse which sells the image of Brazil being a Mestizo country. In a certain way, Brazilians are imprisoned in the symbolic Portuguese universe which causes two types of consequences: they end up pursuing those occupations that match the stereotypes delimiting Brazilians in Portugal; and this subordinated insertion in the job
market in turn reinforces the stereotypes and encourages the construction of a pastiche-identity that legitimizes the ideological reconstruction of the imperial hierarchies.

Brazilians were the piece that was missing on the chessboard of the continuity of the Portuguese imperial mind. Upon completing the pieces in this chess game, the Portuguese also released their secular resentment about Brazil – the colony that was lost at the beginning of the 19th Century. Brazil had caused a gigantic trauma in the Portuguese intelligentsia because it was the country that impeded the continuation of the imperial project in Africa due to the attraction it exercised over Portuguese emigrants and the control that the slave dealing elite in Brazil exercised over Angola and Mozambique until 1850 when the slave traffic was abolished in Brazil. Also, Brazil was the country from which there came a great cultural industry at the end of the 20th century that was responsible for a type of “reverse colonization”. Among resentments and stereotypes, Brazilian immigrants have a specific place in Portuguese racial structure, a subordinated place in reconstructed imperial thinking.

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